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THE	  EMPIRICAL	  STUDY	  OF	  LAW	  AND	  COURTS	  
Artemus	  Ward	  *	  
LEE	  EPSTEIN,	  WILLIAM	  LANDES	  &	  RICHARD	  POSNER,	  THE	  BEHAVIOR	  OF	  FEDERAL	  JUDGES:	  A	  THEORETICAL	  AND	  EMPIRICAL	  STUDY	  OF	  RATIONAL	  CHOICE	   (2012).	  Pp.	  422.	  Hardcover	  $49.95.	  	  NEW	   DIRECTIONS	   IN	   JUDICIAL	   POLITICS	   (Kevin	   T.	   McGuire	   ed.,	   2012).	   Pp.	   338.	  Hardcover	  $47.95.	  	  On	  August	  23,	  2013,	  Justice	  Ruth	  Bader	  Ginsburg	  gave	  an	  interview	  to	  the	  New	  
York	  Times	   in	  which	  she	  described	  the	  current	  Supreme	  Court	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  most	  activist	  courts	   in	  history.”1	  She	  said	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Shelby	  County	  v.	  Holder	  striking	   down	   Section	   4	   of	   the	   Voting	   Rights	   Act	   of	   1965,	   which	   set	   the	   require-­‐ments	  for	  states	  and	  localities	  to	  gain	  preclearance	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  in	  order	  to	  make	  changes	  in	  their	  voting	  laws,	  was	  “stunning	  in	  terms	  of	  activism.”2	  She	  characterized	   the	  Court’s	   role	  as	  part	  of	  an	  ongoing	  dialogue	  with	  outside	  ac-­‐tors:	  “In	  so	  many	  instances,	  the	  Court	  and	  Congress	  have	  been	  having	  conversations	  with	  each	  other,	  particularly	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  area.	  So	  it	  isn’t	  good	  when	  you	  have	  a	  Congress	   that	   can’t	   react.”3	   She	   noted	   the	   jurisprudential	   division	   among	  her	   col-­‐leagues	  and	  highlighted	  her	  position	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Court’s	  liberal	  wing:	  “I	  am	  now	  the	  most	  senior	  justice	  when	  we	  divide	  5-­‐4	  with	  the	  usual	  suspects.”4	  She	  ex-­‐plained	   that	   she	   had	   no	   plans	   to	   retire	   during	   President	   Barack	   Obama’s	   second	  term:	  “There	  will	  be	  a	  president	  after	  this	  one,	  and	  I’m	  hopeful	  that	  that	  president	  will	   be	   a	   fine	   president.”5	   And	   she	   predicted	   the	   eventual	   fate	   of	   her	   opinions:	   “I	  don’t	  see	  that	  my	  majority	  opinions	  are	  going	  to	  be	  undone.	  I	  do	  hope	  that	  some	  of	  my	  dissents	  will	  one	  day	  be	  the	  law.”	  Ginsburg’s	  comments	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  number	  of	  important	  questions	  about	  the	  behavior	  of	   judges	  and	   the	  operation	  of	   courts.	  Are	   some	   judges	  and	  courts	  more	  activist	  than	  others,	  and	  if	  so,	  why?	  Do	  judges	  behave	  strategically	  by	  taking	  into	  ac-­‐count	  the	  behavior	  of	  outside	  actors?	  Why	  do	  judges	  disagree,	  and	  do	  their	  roles	  on	  
                                                            	   *	   Associate	  Professor	  of	  Political	  Science	  at	  Northern	  Illinois	  University.	  	  	  	   1.	  	   Adam	  Liptak,	  Court	  is	  “One	  of	  Most	  Activist,”	  Ginsburg	  Says,	  Vowing	  to	  Stay,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  	  Aug.	   24,	   2013,	   http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/us/court-­‐is-­‐one-­‐of-­‐most-­‐activist-­‐ginsburg-­‐says-­‐vowing-­‐to-­‐stay.html?_r=0.	  	   2.	  	   Id.;	  Shelby	  County	  v.	  Holder,	  570	  U.S.	  ___	  (2013).	  	   3.	  	   Liptak,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	   4.	  	   Id.	  	   5.	  	   Id.	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collegial	  courts	  alter	  their	  behavior?	  Do	  judges	  attempt	  to	  time	  their	  departures	  to	  influence	   the	   choice	   of	   their	   successors?	   How	   important	   is	   the	   judicial	   selection	  process	  for	  the	  future	  direction	  of	  judicial	  decisions?	  The	  last	  decade	  or	  so	  has	  seen	  a	   considerable	   amount	   of	   empirical	   analyses	   brought	   to	   bear	   on	   these	   and	   other	  questions	   of	   interest	   to	   legal	   scholars.6	   In	   short,	   this	   research	   shows	   that	   some	  courts	  and	  judges	  are	  more	  activist	  than	  others.7	  Larger	  contexts	  matter	  and	  courts	  do	  operate	   in	   and	   are	  both	   constrained	   and	  enabled	  by	  outside	   actors.8	   The	  deci-­‐sions	   judges	  make	   are	   based	   on	   a	   number	   of	   factors,	   including	   their	   attitudes	   or	  ideology.9	   Judges	  on	  collegial	  courts	  negotiate,	  bargain,	  and	  accommodate	  one	  an-­‐other.10	   Judges	   attempt	   to	   time	   their	   departures	  both	   to	  minimize	  politicizing	   the	  judiciary	   and	   to	   influence	   the	   choice	   of	   their	   successors.11	   The	   judicial	   selection	  process	   is	   crucial	   for	  determining	   the	   future	  direction	  of	   law.12	   In	   sum,	   the	   litera-­‐ture	  suggests	  that	  judges	  are	  neither	  simply	  legal	  nor	  political	  actors,	  but	  a	  unique	  
                                                            	   6.	  	   The	  “empirical”	  study	  of	   law	  and	  courts	  involves	  systematic,	  replicable	  analysis	  and	  can	  employ	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  methodological	  approaches.	  	   7.	  	   See	  THOMAS	  M.	  KECK,	  THE	  MOST	  ACTIVIST	  SUPREME	  COURT	   IN	  HISTORY:	  THE	  ROAD	  TO	  MODERN	   JUDICIAL	  CONSERVATISM	  (2004).	  	   8.	   	  	  See	  MATTHEW	  E.	  K.	  HALL,	  THE	  NATURE	  OF	  SUPREME	  COURT	  POWER	  (2013);	  JULIE	  NOVKOV,	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT	  AND	  THE	  PRESIDENCY:	  STRUGGLES	  FOR	  SUPREMACY	  (2013);	  RYAN	  C.	  BLACK	  &	  RYAN	  J.	  OWENS,	  THE	  SOLICITOR	  GENERAL	  AND	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  SUPREME	  COURT	  (2012);	  JUSTIN	  CROWE,	  BUILDING	  THE	  JUDICIARY:	  LAW,	  COURTS,	  AND	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  INSTITUTIONAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  (2012);	  TOM	  S.	  CLARK,	  THE	  LIMITS	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  (2010);	  KEITH	  E.	  WHITTINGTON,	  POLITICAL	  FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  SUPREMACY:	  THE	  PRESIDENT,	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT,	   AND	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  LEADERSHIP	   IN	  U.S.	  HISTORY	   (2009);	  VANESSA	  A.	  BAIRD,	  ANSWERING	  THE	  CALL	  OF	  THE	  COURT:	  HOW	  JUSTICES	  AND	  LITIGANTS	  SET	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT	  AGENDA	  (2008);	  PAUL	  M.	  COLLINS	  JR.,	  FRIENDS	  OF	   THE	   SUPREME	   COURT:	   INTEREST	   GROUPS	   AND	   JUDICIAL	   DECISION	  MAKING	   (2008);	   THE	   SUPREME	   COURT	   AND	  AMERICAN	  POLITICAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  (Ronald	  Kahn	  &	  Ken	  I.	  Kersch	  eds.,	  2006);	  KEN	  I.	  KERSCH,	  CONSTRUCTING	  CIVIL	  LIBERTIES:	  DISCONTINUITIES	  IN	  THE	  DEVELOPMENT	  OF	  AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  LAW	  (2004);	  J.	  MITCHELL	  PICKERILL,	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  DELIBERATION	  IN	  CONGRESS:	  THE	  IMPACT	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  REVIEW	  IN	  A	  SEPARATED	  SYSTEM	  (2004);	   KEVIN	   J.	   MCMAHON,	   RECONSIDERING	   ROOSEVELT	   ON	   RACE:	   HOW	   THE	   PRESIDENCY	   PAVED	   THE	   ROAD	   TO	  
BROWN	  (2003);	  SUPREME	  COURT	  DECISION-­‐MAKING:	  NEW	  INSTITUTIONALIST	  APPROACHES	  (Cornell	  W.	  Clayton	  &	  Howard	   Gillman	   eds.,	   1999);	   THE	   SUPREME	   COURT	   IN	   AMERICAN	   POLITICS:	   NEW	   INSTITUTIONALIST	  INTERPRETATIONS	  (Howard	  Gillman	  &	  Cornell	  Clayton	  eds.,	  1999);	  CHARLES	  R.	  EPP,	  THE	  RIGHTS	  REVOLUTION:	  LAWYERS,	  ACTIVISTS,	  AND	  SUPREME	  COURTS	   IN	  COMPARATIVE	  PERSPECTIVE	  (1998);	  LEE	  EPSTEIN	  &	   JACK	  KNIGHT,	  THE	  CHOICES	  JUSTICES	  MAKE	  (1997).	  	   9.	  	   See	  PAMELA	  C.	  CORLEY,	  AMY	  STEIGERWALT	  &	  ARTEMUS	  WARD,	  THE	  PUZZLE	  OF	  UNANIMITY:	  CONSENSUS	  ON	  THE	   UNITED	   STATES	   SUPREME	   COURT	   (2013);	   MICHAEL	   A.	   BAILEY	   &	   FORREST	   MALTZMAN,	   THE	   CONSTRAINED	  COURT:	  LAW,	  POLITICS,	   AND	  THE	  DECISIONS	   JUSTICES	  MAKE	   (2011);	   JEFFREY	  A.	   SEGAL	  &	  HAROLD	   J.	   SPAETH,	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT	  AND	  THE	  ATTITUDINAL	  MODEL	  REVISITED	  (2002).	  	   10.	  	   See	  PAMELA	  C.	  CORLEY,	  CONCURRING	  OPINION	  WRITING	  ON	  THE	  U.S.	  SUPREME	  COURT	  (2011);	  VIRGINIA	  A.	  HETTINGER,	   STEFANIE	   A.	   LINDQUIST	   &	   WENDY	   L.	   MARTINEK,	   JUDGING	   ON	   A	   COLLEGIAL	   COURT:	   INFLUENCES	   ON	  FEDERAL	  APPELLATE	  DECISION	  MAKING	  (2007);	  FORREST	  MALTZMAN,	   JAMES	  F.	  SPRIGGS	   II,	  &	  PAUL	   J.	  WAHLBECK,	  CRAFTING	  LAW	  ON	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT:	  THE	  COLLEGIAL	  GAME	  (2000).	  	   11.	  	   See	   Richard	   L.	   Vining	   Jr.,	   Politics,	   Pragmatism,	   and	   Departures	   from	   the	   U.S.	   Courts	   of	   Appeals,	  
1954-­‐2004,	  90	  SOC.	  SCI.	  Q.	  834	  (2009);	  ARTEMUS	  WARD,	  DECIDING	  TO	  LEAVE:	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  RETIREMENT	  FROM	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  SUPREME	  COURT	  (2003).	  	   12.	  	   See	  JAMES	  L.	  GIBSON,	  ELECTING	  JUDGES:	  THE	  SURPRISING	  EFFECTS	  OF	  CAMPAIGNING	  ON	  JUDICIAL	  LEGITIMACY	  (2012);	   AMY	   STEIGERWALT,	   BATTLE	   OVER	   THE	   BENCH:	   SENATORS,	   INTEREST	   GROUPS,	   AND	   LOWER	   COURT	  CONFIRMATIONS	   (2010);	  SARAH	  A.	  BINDER	  &	  FORREST	  MALTZMAN,	  ADVICE	  &	  DISSENT:	  THE	  STRUGGLE	  TO	  SHAPE	  THE	  FEDERAL	  JUDICIARY	  (2009);	  CHRIS	  W.	  BONNEAU	  &	  MELINDA	  GANN	  HALL,	  IN	  DEFENSE	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  ELECTIONS	  (2009);	  CHRISTINE	  L.	  NEMACHECK,	  STRATEGIC	  SELECTION:	  PRESIDENTIAL	  NOMINATION	  OF	  SUPREME	  COURT	  JUSTICES	  FROM	   HERBERT	   HOOVER	   THROUGH	   GEORGE	   W.	   BUSH	   (2008);	   LEE	   EPSTEIN	   &	   JEFFREY	   A.	   SEGAL,	   ADVICE	   AND	  CONSENT:	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	   JUDICIAL	   APPOINTMENTS	   (2007);	   RUNNING	   FOR	   JUDGE:	   THE	   RISING	   POLITICAL,	  FINANCIAL,	  AND	  LEGAL	  STAKES	  OF	   JUDICIAL	  ELECTIONS	  (Matthew	  J.	  Streb	  ed.,	  2007);	  NANCY	  SCHERER,	  SCORING	  POINTS:	  POLITICIANS,	  ACTIVISTS,	  AND	  THE	  LOWER	  FEDERAL	  COURT	  APPOINTMENT	  PROCESS	  (2005);	  LAUREN	  COHEN	  BELL,	  WARRING	  FACTIONS:	  INTEREST	  GROUPS,	  MONEY,	  AND	  THE	  NEW	  POLITICS	  OF	  SENATE	  CONFIRMATION	  (2002);	  DAVID	   ALISTAIR	   YALOF,	   PURSUIT	   OF	   JUSTICES:	   PRESIDENTIAL	   POLITICS	   AND	   THE	   SELECTION	   OF	   SUPREME	   COURT	  NOMINEES	   (2001);	   SHELDON	   GOLDMAN,	   PICKING	   FEDERAL	   JUDGES:	   LOWER	   COURT	   SELECTION	   FROM	   ROOSEVELT	  THROUGH	  REAGAN	  (1999).	  
2
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combination	  of	  both.	  What	  is	  surprising,	  however,	  is	  that	  this	  body	  of	  empirical	  research	  is	  largely	  unknown	  to	  the	  legal	  community.	  For	  example,	  have	  you	  ever	  seen	  any	  of	  the	  books	  cited	  in	  this	  essay	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  gift	  shop?	  Instead,	  judges	  and	  law	  pro-­‐fessors	  have	  long	  propagated	  so-­‐called	  objective	  or	  neutral	  modes	  of	  decision	  mak-­‐ing	  such	  as	  the	  mechanical	  application	  of	  law	  and	  rules	  to	  facts	  or	  a	  particular	  intel-­‐lectual	  methodology	  such	  as	  “textualism,”	  “originalism,”	  or	  “the	  living	  Constitution”	  to	   describe	   what	   judges	   do	   or	   ought	   to	   do.	   A	   small	   group	   of	   legal	   academics—particularly	  those	  aligned	  with	  the	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  movement—and	  some	  so-­‐cial	  scientists	  and	  journalists	  have	  fostered	  the	  opposite	  conception:	  that	  judges	  are	  simply	  political	  actors,	  not	  unlike	  legislators,	  who	  base	  their	  decisions	  on	  personal	  policy	  preferences.	  Yet	   the	   research	  continues	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   the	   reality	   lies	  somewhere	  in	  between.	   NEW	  RESEARCH	  Adding	  to	  the	  growing	  list	  of	  	  top-­‐notch	   empirical	   research,	   two	   new	   books	  highlight	   the	   best	   of	   what	   this	   literature	   has	   to	   offer:	   Lee	   Epstein,	   William	   M.	  Landes,	  and	  Richard	  A.	  Posner’s,	  The	  Behavior	  of	  Federal	   Judges:	  A	  Theoretical	  and	  
Empirical	  Study	  of	  Rational	  Choice13	  and	  Kevin	  T.	  McGuire’s	  edited	  volume,	  New	  Di-­‐
rections	  in	  Judicial	  Politics.14	  Both	  offer	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  existing	  research	  and	  provide	   rigorous	   analyses	   of	   the	   most	   important	   questions	   that	   law	   and	   courts	  scholars	  are	  concerned	  about:	  the	  behavior	  of	  judges,	  judicial	  selection,	  how	  courts	  operate	  within	  the	  larger	  political	  environment,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  judicial	  decisions,	  including	  how	  courts	  can	  be	  used	  to	  effect	  social	  change.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  they	   cover	   not	   only	   the	   U.S.	   Supreme	   Court,	   but	   also	   the	   lower	   federal	   and	   state	  courts.	  In	  The	  Behavior	  of	  Federal	  Judges,	  the	  authors	  offer	  a	  unified	  theory	  of	  judicial	  decision-­‐making	   for	   all	   federal	   judges:	   district	   courts,	   circuit	   courts,	   and	   the	   Su-­‐preme	   Court.	   Their	   hypotheses	   are	   derived	   from	   a	   labor-­‐market	   model—namely	  that	  judges	  are	  like	  any	  other	  economic	  actor:	  self-­‐interested	  and	  motivated	  by	  both	  the	   pecuniary	   and	  non-­‐pecuniary	   parts	   of	   their	  work.15	   The	   authors	   contend	   that	  this	  model	  does	  a	  better	  job	  in	  explaining	  judicial	  behavior	  than	  the	  traditional	  legal	  or	  attitudinal	  models.16	  Interestingly,	  they	  find	  that	  attitudes	  or	  ideology,	  while	  pre-­‐sent	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  are	  most	  pronounced	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  less	  so	  at	   the	   courts	  of	   appeals,	   and	  even	   less	   at	   the	  district	   courts.17	  They	   conclude	   that	  judges	  are	  neither	   simple	  automatons	  who	  apply	   the	   law	   in	  machine-­‐like	   fashion,	  nor	  are	  they	  mere	  politicians	  in	  robes.18	  The	  scholarly	  community	  will	  be	  familiar	  with	  much	  of	  what	  The	  Behavior	  of	  
Federal	   Judges	  has	  to	  offer	  as	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  the	  book	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  authors’	  
                                                            	   13.	  	   LEE	   EPSTEIN,	   WILLIAM	   M.	   LANDES	   &	   RICHARD	   A.	   POSNER,	   THE	   BEHAVIOR	   OF	   FEDERAL	   JUDGES:	   A	  THEORETICAL	  AND	  EMPIRICAL	  STUDY	  OF	  RATIONAL	  CHOICE	  (2013)	  [hereinafter	  EPSTEIN	  ET	  AL.].	  	   14.	  	   NEW	  DIRECTIONS	  IN	  JUDICIAL	  POLITICS	  (Kevin	  T.	  McGuire	  ed.,	  2012)	  [hereinafter	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS].	  	   15.	  	   See	  EPSTEIN	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  30-­‐47.	  	   16.	  	   Id.	  	   17.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  chs.	  3-­‐5.	  	   18.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  30-­‐47.	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previously	  published	  articles	  on	  the	  subject.	  Yet	  they	  have	  extensively	  revised	  their	  previous	  works	  to	  fit	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  book	  and	  the	  results	  provide	  for	  a	  fluid	  and	  illuminating	  read.	  The	  authors	  note	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  the	  determinants	  of	  judi-­‐cial	  decision-­‐making	  are	  not	  well	  understood	  by	  lawyers,	  law	  professors,	  and	  even	  many	   judges	  themselves.	   Indeed,	   the	  authors	  make	  plain	  that	   their	   intended	  audi-­‐ence	  is	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  because	  the	  better	  that	  judges	  are	  understood,	  the	  more	  effective	   lawyers	   will	   be	   in	   litigating	   cases,	   judges	   will	   be	   in	   the	   performance	   of	  their	  work,	   and	   legal	   education	  will	   be	   for	  both	   continuing	   judicial	   education	  and	  for	  judicial	  reform.19	  One	  hopes	  that	  the	  first-­‐rate	  research	  contained	  in	  both	  The	  Behavior	  of	  Fed-­‐
eral	  Judges	  and	  New	  Directions	  in	  Judicial	  Politics,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  work	  of	  other	  em-­‐pirical	   scholars,	  will	   reach	   legal	  professionals	  soon	  as	   the	  empirical	  evidence	  con-­‐tinues	   to	   mount.	   What	   has	   kept	   them	   away?	   It	   may	   be	   that	   many	   are	   simply	  unfamiliar	   with	   the	   statistical	   techniques	   that	   many	   empirical	   legal	   scholars	   em-­‐ploy.	  If	  so,	  Epstein,	  Landes,	  and	  Posner	  provide	  a	  very	  brief	  technical	  primer	  at	  the	  start	  of	  their	  book	  that	  simply	  and	  elegantly	  introduces	  readers	  to	  hypothesis	  test-­‐ing,	  linear	  and	  logistic	  regression,	  and	  other	  matters	  common	  to	  statistical	  work.20	  Similarly,	  in	  Chapter	  Two	  they	  provide	  an	  excellent	  review	  of	  the	  existing	  empirical	  literature	   on	   judges	  with	   a	   focus	   on	   the	  methodological	   problems	   of	   determining	  judicial	   ideology,	  which	  has	  been	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   judicial	  behavior	   literature.21	  These	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  book	  alone	  provide	  a	  welcome	  service	  for	  those	  in	  the	  le-­‐gal	  profession	  and	  others	  who	  wish	   to	  get	  up	   to	  speed	  on	   the	  current	  state	  of	   the	  empirical	  study	  of	  judicial	  behavior.	  With	  this	  background,	  readers	  will	  not	  only	  be	  able	  to	  interpret	  the	  data	  analysis	  in	  this	  book,	  but	  will	  also	  be	  able	  to	  easily	  under-­‐stand	  the	  chapters	  in	  McGuire’s	  volume	  and	  the	  other	  works	  they	  both	  cite	  and	  dis-­‐cuss.	  The	  substantive	  chapters	  of	  The	  Behavior	  of	  Federal	  Judges	  begin	  with	  Chapter	  One,	  where	  the	  authors	  introduce	  their	  model—what	  they	  call	  a	  realistic	  theory	  of	  judicial	  behavior.22	  By	  “realistic”	  the	  authors	  mean	  a	  self-­‐interested	  economic	  mod-­‐el	  of	  behavior.	  Specifically,	  they	  contend	  that	  judges	  are	  motivated	  by	  such	  factors	  as	   effort,	   esteem,	   influence,	   self-­‐expression,	   celebrity,	   and	   career	   advancement	  (promotion	  to	  a	  higher	  court),	  but	  also	  constrained	  by	  professional	  and	  institutional	  rules	  and	  expectations,	  and	  by	  the	  tools	  and	  methods	  used	  by	  judges	  in	  doing	  their	  work.23	  The	   authors	  do	  not	  deny	   that	   other	   factors	   are	   at	  work,	   such	   as	  personal	  characteristics	  like	  race,	  sex,	  and	  educational	  background	  or	  ideology,	  but	  their	  fo-­‐cus	  is	  on	  presenting	  the	  simplest	  model	  possible	  to	  explain	  why	  judges	  decide	  cases	  the	  way	   they	  do.24	   Chapters	  Three	   through	  Eight	   constitute	   the	   empirical	   tests	   of	  the	   authors’	   hypotheses.	  They	  measure	   traditional	   influences	  on	   judicial	   behavior	  including	  ideology	  and	  law,	  but	  go	  further	  in	  fascinating	  ways.	  For	  example,	  “effort	  aversion”	  measures	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  judges	  want	  to	  live	  a	  “quiet	  life”	  of	   leisure	  
                                                            	   19.	  	   Id.	  at	  6.	  	   20.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  17-­‐24.	  	   21.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  65-­‐100.	  	   22.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  25-­‐64.	  	   23.	  	   Id.	  at	  48.	  	   24.	  	   Id.	  at	  44.	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as	  defined	  by	  a	  reluctance	  to	  work	  “too”	  hard	  and	  avoid	  conflict	  with	  colleagues.25	  U.S.	  SUPREME	  COURT	  In	   Chapter	   Three,	   Epstein,	   Landes,	   and	   Posner	   examine	   the	   ideology	   of	   Su-­‐preme	  Court	  Justices—by	  far	  the	  most	  studied	  question	  in	  the	  literature—and	  con-­‐firm	   what	   the	   literature	   suggests,	   namely	   that	   Justices	   appointed	   by	   Democratic	  presidents	  generally	  vote	   in	  a	   liberal	  direction,	  while	   those	  appointed	  by	  Republi-­‐can	  presidents	  generally	  vote	  in	  a	  conservative	  direction.26	  This	  is	  most	  pronounced	  in	  cases	  involving	  civil	  rights	  and	  less	  pronounced	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  federalism,	  priva-­‐cy,	   and	   judicial	   power	   and	   reinforces	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   largely	  deals	  with	  politically	   charged	   issues	  where	   the	   law	   is	   indeterminate.	  The	   authors	  further	   show	   that	   Justices	   do	   not	   always	   share	   the	   ideology	   of	   their	   appointing	  presidents	  and	  that	  a	  Justice’s	  ideology	  may	  change	  or	  drift	  over	  time.27	  The	  authors	  also	  find	  that	  while	  the	  Court	  reaches	  unanimity	  in	  roughly	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  cases	  it	  decides,	  there	  are	  still	  ideological	  influences	  at	  work.28	  Finally,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	   group	   effects—the	   notion	   that	   there	   will	   be	   pressure	   to	   join	   a	   coalition	   as	   it	  grows—and	  the	  authors	  attribute	  this	  to	   life	  tenure	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  ambition	  from	  promotion	  to	  higher	  office	  that	  is	  unique	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court.29	  Chapter	  Seven	  also	  focuses	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  but	  examines	  the	   increas-­‐ingly	   studied	   question	   of	   the	   goals	   Justices	   have	   during	   oral	   argument.30	   The	   au-­‐thors	  suggest	  that	  oral	  argument	  is	  much	  more	  than	  a	  forum	  for	  establishing	  facts	  and	  truth	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  law.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  a	  strategic	  process	  where	  the	  Justices’	  personalities	  and	  leisure	  preferences	  drive	  their	  questioning.31	  Specifi-­‐cally,	   Justices	  who	  are	  extroverts	  and	  like	  to	  participate	  in	  many	  public	  events	  are	  also	   generally	   active	   questioners	   at	   oral	   argument,	   but	   not	   in	   every	   case,	   as	  with	  Justices	  Clarence	  Thomas	  and	  David	  Souter.	  
New	  Directions	  in	  Judicial	  Politics	  also	  offers	  a	  number	  of	  chapters	  on	  the	  Su-­‐preme	  Court.	  Ryan	  Black	  and	  Ryan	  Owens	   focus	  on	  agenda	  setting.32	  They	   look	  at	  the	  private	  papers	  of	   Justice	  Harry	  Blackmun	   for	   the	   individual	  certiorari	  votes	  of	  the	  Justices	  and	  other	  information	  such	  as	  the	  issues	  contained	  in	  the	  pool	  memos.	  They	  find	  that	  three	  broad	  considerations	  influence	  the	  Justices:	  1)	  Justices	  vote	  to	  grant	  review	  when	  they	  expect	  policy	  gains	  from	  hearing	  the	  case,	  2)	  Justices	  vote	  to	  grant	  review	  when	  legal	  factors	  suggest	  they	  should,	  and	  3)	  policy	  and	  legal	  con-­‐siderations	   interact	  with	   each	   other	   and	   jointly	   explain	   agenda	   setting.33	   In	   their	  
                                                            	   25.	  	   Id.	  at	  7.	  	   26.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  101-­‐52.	  	   27.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  116-­‐23.	  	   28.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  124-­‐37.	  	   29.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  144-­‐49.	  	   30.	  	   See	   RYAN	   C.	   BLACK,	   TIMOTHY	   R.	   JOHNSON	   &	   JUSTIN	   WEDEKING,	   ORAL	   ARGUMENTS	   AND	   COALITION	  FORMATION	  ON	  THE	  U.S.	  SUPREME	  COURT	  (2012);	  Timothy	  R.	  Johnson,	  Paul	  J.	  Wahlbeck	  &	  James	  F.	  Spriggs	  II,	  
The	   Influence	   of	   Oral	   Argumentation	   Before	   the	   U.S.	   Supreme	   Court,	   100	   AM.	   POL.	   SCI.	   REV.	   99	   (2006);	  TIMOTHY	  R.	  JOHNSON,	  ORAL	  ARGUMENT	  AND	  DECISION	  MAKING	  ON	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  SUPREME	  COURT	  (2004).	  	   31.	  	   See	  EPSTEIN	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  305-­‐11.	  	   32.	  	   See	  Ryan	  C.	  Black	  &	  Ryan	   J.	  Owens,	  Supreme	  Court	  Agenda	  Setting:	  Policy	  Uncertainty	  and	  Legal	  
Considerations,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  144-­‐66.	  	   33.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  149-­‐55.	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chapter,	  Timothy	  Johnson,	  James	  Spriggs,	  and	  Paul	  Wahlbeck	  explore	  the	  origin	  and	  development	  of	  stare	  decisis	   at	   the	  Supreme	  Court.34	  They	  analyze	   the	  citations	   in	  Supreme	  Court	  opinions	  to	  show	  how	  the	  Court	  moved	  from	  common	  law	  to	  rely	  on	  its	  own	  precedent	  by	  the	  1810s—partly	  because	  the	  Justices	  saw	  law	  as	  important	  to	  judicial	  decision	  making	  and	  partly	  because	  they	  saw	  stare	  decisis	  as	  a	  vehicle	  to	  enhance	  the	  Court’s	  legitimacy.35	  They	  further	  show	  how	  the	  Court’s	  expanding	  re-­‐liance	  on	  its	  own	  precedent	  over	  time	  served	  to	  insulate	  it	  from	  attacks	  by	  other	  in-­‐stitutions.36	   Tom	   Clark’s	   chapter	   on	   bargaining	   and	   opinion	  writing	   on	   the	   Court	  provides	  an	  excellent	  overview	  of	  the	  large	  literature	  on	  the	  subject	  with	  particular	  attention	   to	   the	   strengths	   and	  weaknesses	   of	   the	   empirical	   approaches	   that	   have	  been	   employed	   for	   testing	   the	   various	   theories	   about	   the	   process.	   Clark	   suggests	  that	  no	  existing	  model	  accurately	  captures	  the	  process	  and	  that	  future	  empirical	  re-­‐search	   should	   focus	   on	  measuring	   the	   doctrinal	   content	   of	   opinions	   and	   the	   non-­‐ideological	  features	  of	  judicial	  decision-­‐making.37	  COURTS	  OF	  APPEALS	  Chapter	   Four	   in	  The	  Behavior	   of	   Federal	   Judges	   focuses	   on	   the	   courts	   of	   ap-­‐peals	   and	   shows	   that	   their	   judges	   exhibit	   less	   ideological	   behavior	   and	   greater	  group	  effects	  than	  are	  present	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  This	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  man-­‐datory	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  courts	  of	  appeals—which	  provides	  for	  a	  heavier	  workload	  and	   for	   less	   ideologically	  charged	  cases—and	  the	  resultant	  effort	  aversion	   that	   its	  judges	   exhibit.	   Interestingly,	   the	   authors	   employ	   two	   measures	   of	   ideology	   for	  courts	  of	  appeals	  judges.	  First,	  based	  on	  their	  own	  online	  research,	  they	  determine	  a	   judges’	   ideology	   before	   they	   began	   their	   appointment.38	   The	   authors	   find	   that	  their	   classifications—strongly	   conservative,	   moderately	   conservative,	   moderately	  liberal,	  and	  strongly	  liberal—have	  a	  strong	  correlation	  to	  the	  party	  of	  the	  appoint-­‐ing	  president.39	  Thus,	  the	  appointing	  president’s	  party	  is	  a	  valid	  proxy	  for	  the	  ideo-­‐logical	  predispositions	  of	  courts	  of	  appeals	  judges.	  At	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  level,	  they	  find	  that	  their	  classifications	  are	  more	  valid	  (have	  fewer	  anomalies)	  than	  the	  often-­‐used	  Segal-­‐Cover	  scores.40	  Second,	  they	  compare	  their	  “ex	  ante”	  measure	  of	  ideology	  to	  “ex	  post	  ideology”	  based	  on	  judicial	  votes.41	  Surprisingly,	  they	  find	  that	  courts	  of	  appeals	   judges	   behave	   in	   a	   more	   moderate	   fashion	   than	   their	   ex	   ante	   ideology	  would	  predict.42	  The	  authors	  attribute	  this	  not	  to	  ideological	  drift	  or	  panel	  composi-­‐tion,	  but	   instead	   to	   the	  constraining	  effect	  of	  precedent	   (law),	  which	   is	  more	  pro-­‐
                                                            	   34.	  	   See	  Timothy	  R.	   Johnson,	   James	  F.	   Spriggs	   II	  &	  Paul	   J.	  Wahlbeck,	  The	  Origin	   and	  Development	   of	  Stare	  Decisis	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  167-­‐85.	  	   35.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  169-­‐72.	  	   36.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  175-­‐81.	  	   37.	  	   See	  Tom	  S.	  Clark,	  Bargaining	  and	  Opinion	  Writing	  on	   the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court,	   in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  
supra	  note	  14,	  at	  186-­‐204.	  	   38.	  	   See	  EPSTEIN	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  154-­‐58.	  	   39.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  177-­‐81.	  	   40.	  	   See	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Segal	  &	  Albert	  D.	  Cover,	  Ideological	  Values	  and	  the	  Votes	  of	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  Justic-­‐
es,	  83	  AM.	  POL.	  SCI.	  REV.	  557	  (1989);	  See	  also	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Segal	  et	  al.,	  Ideological	  Values	  and	  the	  Votes	  of	  the	  
U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  Justices	  Revisited,	  57	  J.	  OF	  POL.	  812	  (1995).	  	   41.	  	   See	  EPSTEIN	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  177-­‐83.	  	   42.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  178-­‐79.	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nounced	  at	  the	  courts	  of	  appeals	  than	  it	  is	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court.43	  In	  Chapter	  Six,	  Epstein,	  Landes,	  and	  Posner	  discuss	  dissent	  aversion:	   the	   re-­‐luctance	  by	  some	  judges	  to	  dissent	  publicly	  even	  when	  they	  disagree	  with	  their	  col-­‐leagues.	  This	   is	   largely	  attributed	  to	  effort	  aversion	  rather	  than	  to	   factors	  that	   the	  traditional	  ideological	  or	  legal	  models	  would	  suggest.44	  Courts	  of	  appeals	  judges	  are	  far	  more	  prone	  to	  dissent	  aversion	  than	  are	  Supreme	  Court	  justices	  because	  of	  the	  smaller	  number	  of	  judges	  participating	  in	  cases—usually	  three	  at	  the	  courts	  of	  ap-­‐peals—and	  the	  greater	  workload	  that	  those	  judges	  are	  faced	  with.45	  
New	  Directions	  in	  Judicial	  Politics	  continues	  the	  discussion	  of	  appellate	  courts	  with	   a	   chapter	   by	   Virginia	  Hettinger	   and	   Stefanie	   Lindquist	   on	  why	   and	   how	   the	  courts	  of	  appeals	  reverse	  lower	  court	  decisions.	  Examining	  data	  from	  the	  1980s	  to	  the	  present,	  they	  show	  how	  even	  though	  reversal	  rates	  are	  relatively	  low	  (less	  than	  15	  percent	  per	  year)	  there	  is	  considerable	  variation	  over	  time	  and	  across	  circuits.46	  The	  authors	  also	  examine	  the	  factors	  that	  might	  influence	  individual	  circuit	  judges	  to	  reverse	  (or	  affirm)	  the	  lower	  court.	  Their	  model	  includes	  a	  number	  of	  variables	  thought	  to	  influence	  judicial	  behavior.	  They	  find	  that	  ideological	  disagreement,	  pri-­‐or	   experience	   as	   a	  district	   court	   judge,	  whether	   the	  U.S.	   government	   is	   the	   losing	  litigant	  making	  the	  appeal,	   the	  presence	  of	  amicus	  briefs,	  and	  the	   legal	  and	  proce-­‐dural	  posture	  of	   the	  case	   increase	   the	  chances	   that	  a	   circuit	   judge	  will	  vote	   to	   re-­‐verse	  the	  lower	  court.47	  Conversely,	  they	  find	  no	  effect	  for	  workload	  or	  circuit	  court	  norms.48	   TRIAL	  COURTS	  Both	  books	  offer	  research	  on	  trial	  courts—an	  area	  that	  has	  been	  far	  less	  stud-­‐ied	  than	  appellate	  courts.	  Chapter	  Five	  in	  The	  Behavior	  of	  Federal	  Judges	  covers	  fed-­‐eral	  district	  courts,	  with	  the	  authors	  finding	  that	  ideology	  is	  less	  operative	  than	  le-­‐gal	   considerations	   such	   as	   standing,	   ripeness,	  mootness,	   and	   other	   doctrines	   that	  allow	  for	  early	  dismissal	  of	  cases.49	  Given	  the	  district	  courts’	  lack	  of	  control	  over	  the	  cases	   that	  come	   to	   them,	   the	  authors	  conclude	   that	   their	   findings	  are	  not	  surpris-­‐ing.50	  In	  New	  Directions	  in	  Judicial	  Politics,	  Isaac	  Unah	  examines	  the	  relationship	  be-­‐tween	  race	  and	  death	  sentencing	  by	  looking	  at	  homicide	  cases	  over	  a	  five-­‐year	  peri-­‐od	   during	   the	   1990s	   in	  North	   Carolina.	  He	   finds	   that	   the	   aggravated	  murder	   of	   a	  white	  individual	  is	  3.4	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  a	  death	  sentence	  compared	  to	  the	  murder	  of	  a	  nonwhite	  individual,	  and	  that	  nonwhite	  killers	  of	  whites	  are	  over-­‐whelmingly	  more	  likely	  to	  receive	  the	  death	  penalty	  than	  any	  other	  racial	  configu-­‐
                                                            	   43.	  	   Id.	  at	  180.	  	   44.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  261-­‐62.	  	   45.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  262-­‐64.	  	   46.	  	   Virginia	  A.	  Hettinger	  &	  Stefanie	  A.	  Lindquist,	  Decision	  Making	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Courts	  of	  Appeals:	  The	  De-­‐
terminants	  of	  Reversal	  on	  Appeal,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  126,	  129.	  	   47.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  132-­‐41.	  	   48.	  	   See	  id.	  	   49.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  10,	  225-­‐31.	  	   50.	  	   See	  id.	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ration.51	  William	  Haltom	   and	  Michael	  McCann	   explain	   how	   activist	   plaintiffs	  may	  advance	   their	   causes	   even	   as	   they	   lose	   their	   cases.	   Specifically,	   they	   review	  news	  coverage	  of	   litigation	  over	  tobacco,	   firearms,	  silicon	  breast	   implants,	  and	  food	  and	  find	   that	   the	   plaintiff	   suits	   on	   these	   matters	   generate	   media	   coverage	   that	   ad-­‐vantages	  them	  and	  their	  causes	  and	  denigrates	  producers	  and	  vendors	  for	  practices	  that	  are	  deemed	  irresponsible	  or	  even	  criminal.52	  Indeed,	  litigation	  generates	  more	  favorable	  coverage	  for	  activists	  than	  stories	  about	  issues	  or	  policy	  alone.	  JUDICIAL	  SELECTION	  Judicial	  selection	  has	  long	  been	  an	  important	  topic	  for	  discussion	  among	  aca-­‐demics	  and	  both	  books	  address	  the	  topic	  from	  an	  empirical	  perspective.	  In	  Chapter	  Eight	  of	  The	  Behavior	  of	  Federal	  Judges,	  the	  authors	  explore	  the	  behavior	  of	  judges	  who	   have	   a	   realistic	   chance	   at	   promotion.	   Do	   judges	   “audition”	   for	   promotion	   to	  higher	   courts?	   The	   authors’	   use	   past	   scholarly	   and	   popular	   literature	   to	   identify	  past	  auditioners,	  and	  then	  derive	  the	  common	  factors	  that	  these	  judges	  exhibit,	  in-­‐cluding	   age,	   year	   confirmed,	   party	   of	   appointing	   president,	   law	   school,	   sex,	   and	  race.53	  They	   find	   that	  potential	   auditioners	  do	   generally	   tend	   to	   alter	   their	   voting	  behavior	  to	  improve	  their	  prospects	  for	  promotion,	  with	  courts	  of	  appeals	  audition-­‐ers	  more	   likely	   to	  do	   so	   than	  district	   court	   auditioners.54	  This	   chapter	  provides	   a	  nice	  lead-­‐in	  to	  Part	  I	  of	  McGuire’s	  book,	  which	  covers	  the	  topic	  of	  judicial	  selection	  from	  three	  different	  angles.	  Building	   on	   her	   book	   on	   the	   topic,	   Christine	   Nemacheck’s	   chapter	   looks	   at	  strategy	  and	  uncertainty	  in	  choosing	  Supreme	  Court	  nominees	  from	  1930	  to	  2005	  (39	   nominations	   and	   240	   candidates).	   Using	   archival	   documents,	   she	   develops	  presidential	   shortlists	   and	   empirically	   analyzes	   the	   factors	   that	   affected	   a	   presi-­‐dent’s	  decision	  to	  select	  a	  nominee.55	  She	  finds	  support	  for	  presidents’	  use	  of	  both	  informational—lessening	  uncertainty	  about	  a	  candidate’s	  future	  behavior—and	  po-­‐litical—improving	   a	   candidate’s	   chances	   for	   confirmation—strategies.56	   Jonathan	  Kastellec,	   Jeffrey	  Lax,	  and	   Justin	  Phillips	  examine	   the	   role	  of	  public	  opinion	   in	  Su-­‐preme	  Court	  confirmations.	  They	  empirically	  test	  the	  relationship	  between	  confir-­‐mation	  votes	  and	  constituent	  opinion,	  a	  senator’s	  partisanship,	  and	  the	  ideological	  distance	   between	   a	   senator	   and	   a	   nominee,	   and	   find	   that	   constituent	   opinion—measured	  at	  the	  state	  level—is	  a	  strong	  predictor	  of	  a	  senator’s	  roll	  call	  vote	  even	  when	  controlling	  for	  other	  factors.57	  The	  final	  chapter	  in	  this	  section	  is	  by	  Damon	  Cann,	  Chris	  Bonneau,	  and	  Brent	  Boyea,	  and	  deals	  with	  campaign	  contributions	  and	  judicial	  decisions	  in	  partisan	  and	  
                                                            	   51.	  	   Issac	  Unah,	  Race	  and	  Death	  Sentencing,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  55.	  	   52.	  	   See	   William	   Haltom	   &	   Michael	   McCann,	   Under-­‐Estimating	   and	   Over-­‐Estimating	   Litigation:	   How	  
Activist	  Plaintiffs	  may	  Advance	  Their	  Causes	  Even	  as	  they	  Lose	  Their	  Cases,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  80,	  88-­‐103.	  	   53.	  	   EPSTEIN	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  365.	  	   54.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  369-­‐79.	  	   55.	  	   Christine	   L.	   Nemacheck,	   Selecting	   Justice:	   Strategy	   and	   Uncertainty	   in	   Choosing	   Supreme	   Court	  
Nominees,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  14.	  	   56.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  15-­‐18.	  	   57.	  	   See	   Jonathan	  P.	  Kastellec,	   Jeffrey	  R.	   Lax	  &	   Justin	  Phillips,	  The	  Role	   of	   Public	  Opinion	   in	   Supreme	  
Court	  Confirmations,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  20-­‐37.	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nonpartisan	  elections.	  The	  topic	  of	   judicial	  elections	  has	  garnered	  considerable	  at-­‐tention	   from	   the	   scholarly	   community	   in	   recent	   years	  with	  much	   empirical	  work	  devoted	  to	  the	  topic.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  authors	  gathered	  data	  on	  the	  decisions	  dur-­‐ing	  the	  2005	  term	  of	  three	  state	  supreme	  courts	  whose	  judges	  are	  selected	  through	  competitive	   elections:	  Nevada,	   Texas,	   and	  Michigan.58	   They	   use	   data	   on	   contribu-­‐tions	   from	   attorneys	   and	   law	   firms	   in	   the	  most	   recent	   election	   campaign	   to	   test	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  dollars	  and	  decisions.	  Consistent	  with	  prior	  studies,	  they	  find	  mixed	  results	  with	  evidence	  of	  correlation	  and	  suggestions	  of	  cau-­‐sality	  in	  Michigan	  (which	  has	  partisan	  elections)	  but	  no	  evidence	  of	  even	  a	  correla-­‐tional	   relationship	   in	  Nevada	   (which	  does	   not	   have	  partisan	   elections)	   and	  Texas	  (which	  does	  have	  them).59	   COURTS	  IN	  CONTEXT	  
New	  Directions	   in	   Judicial	  Politics	  offers	  a	  number	  of	  chapters	  on	  how	  courts	  operate	  in	  the	  larger	  political	  environment,	  including	  the	  implementation	  of	  judicial	  decisions.	  Two	  chapters	   focus	  on	   the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court.	  Michael	  Bailey	  and	  For-­‐rest	  Maltzman	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  president,	  and	  Congress.60	  They	  identify	  four	  areas	  where	  elected	  branches	  can	  and	  do	  influ-­‐ence	   the	   Court:	   the	   appointment	   process,	   deference	   by	   judges	   to	   political	   actors,	  overrides	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  by	  Congress	  and	  the	  president	  (particularly	  in	  statu-­‐tory	  cases),	  and	  through	  the	  expertise	  of	  actors	  outside	  the	  Court	  such	  as	  legislative	  committees	  and	   the	   solicitor	  general.61	  The	  authors	   conclude	   that	   each	   constraint	  allows	  the	  national	  will	  to	  affect	  what	  the	  Court	  does.62	  Paul	  Collins	  explains	  the	  in-­‐fluence	  of	   interest	  groups	  on	  judicial	  policy.	  He	  details	  how	  interest	  group	  partici-­‐pation	   through	  amicus	   curiae	   briefs	  has	   steadily	   grown	  over	   time	  with	   increasing	  diversity	  in	  terms	  of	  issue	  areas	  and	  participating	  actors.63	  Collins	  reviews	  the	  em-­‐pirical	   literature	  on	   the	   impact	   of	  amici	   curiae	   in	   terms	  of	   both	  methodology	   and	  findings.	  In	  short,	  these	  studies	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  amicus	  briefs	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	   for	   both	   clerks	   and	   justices	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   at	   the	   Supreme	  Court.64	  Do	  lower	  courts	  follow	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court?	  Three	  chap-­‐ters	   tackle	   this	   topic.	  Sara	  Benesh	  and	  Wendy	  Martinek	  delve	   into	   the	  question	  of	  lower-­‐court	   compliance	   with	   precedent	   through	   a	   review	   of	   the	   empirical	   litera-­‐ture.	  The	  research	  shows	  that	  the	  lower	  courts—and	  the	  federal	  courts	  in	  particu-­‐lar—generally	  comply	  with	  Supreme	  Court	  precedents.65	  The	  authors	  suggest	  that	  
                                                            	   58.	  	   See	  Damon	  M.	  Cann,	  Chris	  W.	  Bonneau	  &	  Brent	  D.	  Boyea,	  Campaign	  Contributions	  and	  Judicial	  De-­‐
cisions	  in	  Partisan	  and	  Nonpartisan	  Elections,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  41-­‐43.	  	   59.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  43-­‐51.	  	   60.	  	   See	  Michael	  A.	  Bailey	  &	  Forrest	  Maltzman,	  Goldilocks	  and	   the	  Supreme	  Court:	  Understanding	   the	  
Relationship	  between	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	   the	  President,	  and	  the	  Congress,	   in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  207-­‐20.	  	   61.	  	   See	  id.	  	   62.	  	   Id.	  at	  220.	  	   63.	  	   See	   Paul	  M.	   Collins	   Jr.,	   Interest	   Groups	   and	  Their	   Influence	   on	   Judicial	   Policy,	   in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  
supra	  note	  14,	  at	  221-­‐36.	  	   64.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  232-­‐34.	  	   65.	  	   See	   Sara	   C.	   Benesh	   &	   Wendy	   L.	   Martinek,	   Lower	   Court	   Compliance	   with	   Precedent,	   in	   NEW	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this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  Court’s	  legitimacy	  and	  that	  as	  long	  as	  the	  Court	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  legiti-­‐mate	  institution,	  its	  dictates	  will	  be	  followed.66	  Scott	  Comparato,	  Scott	  McClurg,	  and	  Shane	   Gleason	   look	   at	   whether	   state	   supreme	   courts	   follow	   U.S.	   Supreme	   Court	  precedent.	  They	  compare	  state	  supreme	  court	  judges	  across	  three	  different	  institu-­‐tional	   contexts:	   judges	   who	   are	   selected	   by	   elites,	   judges	   who	   gain	   their	   seats	  through	  competitive	  elections,	   and	   those	  who	  are	   selected	   through	  a	  merit	   reten-­‐tion	  election.67	  Overall,	  they	  find	  that	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  precedent	  is	  not	  uniformly	  applied	  across	  states.	  State	  supreme	  court	  judges	  use	  Supreme	  Court	  precedent	  to	  further	  their	  policy	  goals	  or	  to	  bolster	  their	  chances	  for	  electoral	  success,	  depending	  on	  case	  salience	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  past	  conflict	  between	  the	  state	  supreme	  court	  and	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court.68	  Similarly,	  Kevin	  McGuire	  examines	  how	  state	  supreme	  court	  judges	  interpret	  the	   First	   Amendment’s	   Establishment	   Clause	   and	   the	   precedents	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Su-­‐preme	  Court.	  His	  empirical	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  all	  Establishment	  Clause	  cases	  de-­‐cided	   by	   state	   supreme	   courts	   from	   1960-­‐2010	   (335	   cases).69	   He	   operationalizes	  local	   political	   pressure	   in	   various	   ways,	   including	   whether	   judges	   are	   elected,	  whether	  the	  court	  is	  located	  in	  the	  South,	  and	  the	  percentage	  of	  Evangelical	  Chris-­‐tians	  in	  each	  state,	  while	  controlling	  for	  other	  potential	  influences.70	  McGuire	  finds	  that	  state	  supreme	  court	  judges	  are	  influenced	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  factors,	  including	  lo-­‐cal	   political	   preferences	   and	   the	   traditional	   values	   of	   the	   Christian	   Right	   in	   the	  South.	  Furthermore,	  he	  finds	  that	  elected	  judges	  are	  particularly	  prone	  to	  deviating	  from	   federal	   precedent	   because	   following	   it	   may	   harm	   their	   chances	   for	   re-­‐election.71	  Richard	  Sander	  moves	  beyond	  courts	  complying	  with	  courts	  to	  the	  implemen-­‐tation	  of	  court	  decisions.	  He	  offers	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  effects	  of	  judi-­‐cial	   pronouncements.72	   Specifically,	   he	   examines	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Supreme	  Court’s	  affirmative	  action	  decisions	  on	  university	  admissions	  policies.	  He	  marshals	  admissions	  data	  by	  race	  for	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan	  (both	  undergraduate	  and	  the	  law	  school)	  in	  particular	  and	  for	  a	  wider	  sample	  of	  public	  law	  schools	  in	  general.73	  He	  finds	  that	  rather	  than	  minimizing	  the	  influence	  of	  race	  in	  admissions	  decisions,	  the	  Court’s	  rulings	  had	  the	  opposite	  effect:	  racial	  preferences	  became	  larger,	  partic-­‐ular	   racial	   classifications	   became	  more	   determinative,	   and	   the	   entire	   admissions	  process	  became	  more	  mechanical	  than	  ever.74	  
                                                                                                                                                    DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  260-­‐74.	  	   66.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  272-­‐74.	  	   67.	  	   See	   Scott	   A.	   Comparato,	   Scott	   D.	  McClurg	   &	   Shane	   A.	   Gleason,	   Patterns	   of	   Policy	  Making	   across	  
State	  Supreme	  Courts,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  119-­‐22.	  	   68.	  	   See	  id.	  	   69.	  	   Kevin	  T.	  McGuire,	  Public	  Opinion,	  Religion,	  and	  Constraints	  on	  Judicial	  Behavior,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  
supra	  note	  14,	  at	  246.	  	   70.	  	   Id.	  at	  249.	  	   71.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  248-­‐52.	  	   72.	  	   See	   Richard	   Sander,	  Why	   Strict	   Scrutiny	   Requires	   Transparency:	   The	   Practical	   Effects	   of	   Bakke,	  Gratz,	  and	  Grutter,	  in	  NEW	  DIRECTIONS,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  277-­‐98.	  	   73.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  291-­‐96.	  	   74.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  296-­‐98.	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CONCLUSION	  As	   Justice	   Ginsburg’s	   interview	   demonstrates,	   there	   are	   many	   questions	  raised	  by	  legal	  actors	  that	  can	  be	  studied	  empirically.	  Both	  The	  Behavior	  of	  Federal	  
Judges	   and	  New	   Directions	   in	   Judicial	   Politics	   not	   only	   demonstrate	   through	   their	  impressive	  review	  of	  existing	  literature	  that	  scholars	  of	  law	  and	  courts	  have	  devel-­‐oped	   a	   considerable	   body	  of	   research	   on	   these	   important	   questions,	   but	   that	   this	  inquiry	  is	  ongoing	  and	  continues	  to	  bear	  fruit.	  Taken	  together,	  both	  books	  offer	  new	  insight	   across	   different	   legal	   settings	   (e.g.,	   appellate	   and	   trial	   courts;	   federal	   and	  state	  courts).	  They	  make	  plain	  that	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  legal	  scholars	  are	  using	  the	  tools	  of	  social	  science	  to	  explain	  how	  courts	  function	  and	  judges	  operate.	  The	  schol-­‐arly	  community	  will	  no	  doubt	  seek	  out	  both	  books,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  practitioners	  them-­‐selves—lawyers,	   judges,	  and	  the	   larger	  polity—who	  can	  most	  benefit	   from	  under-­‐standing	   not	   only	   how	  we	   study	   law	   and	   courts	   but,	  more	   importantly,	   what	  we	  find.	  A	  careful	  read	  of	  these	  new	  books	  will	  aid	  lawyers	  in	  becoming	  better	  litigators	  and	   counselors,	   judges	   in	   becoming	   more	   conscious	   of	   the	   various	   determinants	  and	  implications	  of	  their	  own	  work,	  and	  the	  larger	  political	  community	  in	  thinking	  about	  how	   law	  and	  courts	   should	  be	   constituted	   in	   the	  United	  States.	   If	   change	   is	  necessary,	  it	  will	  be	  most	  evident	  through	  the	  empirical	  study	  of	  law	  and	  courts.	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